During the 2000s, several states adopted laws requiring employers to verify new employees' eligibility to work legally in the United States. This study uses data from the 2005-2014 American Community Survey to examine how such laws affect unauthorized immigrants' locational choices. The results indicate that having an E-Verify law reduces the number of lesseducated prime-age immigrants from Mexico and Central America-immigrants who are likely to be unauthorized-living in a state. We find evidence that some new migrants are diverted to other states, but also suggestive evidence that some already-present migrants leave the country entirely.
Introduction
U.S. states and localities adopted an unprecedented number of laws regarding immigrants during the late 2000s and early 2010s. Many of these laws were aimed at reducing the unauthorized immigrant population, with state lawmakers claiming they were responding to inaction by the federal government. One of the most commonly adopted laws requires employers to electronically verify new employees' eligibility to work legally in the United States. These provisions, often called "E-Verify laws" because they require employers to use the federal EVerify system, may reduce the number of unauthorized immigrants living in a state by making it harder for them to find or switch jobs.
Understanding the effect of E-Verify laws on the number and locational choices of unauthorized immigrants is important given this population's size. About 11.3 million unauthorized immigrants lived in the United States in 2014, accounting for 3.5 percent of the U.S. population and more than 5 percent of the labor force . Slightly more than one-quarter of immigrants living in the United States were unauthorized. Despite these sizable numbers, the unauthorized immigrant population has shrunk in recent years. In 2007, before the Great Recession, it totaled about 12.2 million and 30 percent of all immigrants living in the United States.
The recession likely was the major cause of the decline in the unauthorized immigrant population, which fell by almost one million between 2007 and 2009 . The drop appears to have been comprised of both a decline in new arrivals and an increase in departures from the United States (Passel et al. 2012) . Stricter enforcement policies, including implementation of E-Verify requirements in several states as well as record numbers of deportations and removals from the country, may also have played a role in the unauthorized immigrant population's drop and failure to rebound even as the economic recovery gained steam.
Previous research generally shows that stricter enforcement policies, including state EVerify laws, have a negative effect on unauthorized immigrants' labor market outcomes. The wage penalty incurred by unauthorized immigrant workers from Mexico rose after the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) first made it illegal to hire unauthorized immigrants (Donato and Massey 1993) . Employment and earnings fell among unauthorized immigrants as border and interior enforcement ramped up in the United States in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Orrenius and Zavodny 2009) . After Arizona became the first state to require virtually all employers to electronically verify new hires' eligibility to work in the United States, wage-and-salary employment fell among non-U.S. citizen Hispanics there while selfemployment rose (Bohn and Lofstrom 2013) . Nationwide, unauthorized immigrants' employment and earnings tended to fall in states that adopted E-Verify laws, although there is also some evidence of positive effects on earnings and labor force participation (AmuedoDorantes and Bansak 2012, 2014; Orrenius and Zavodny 2015) .
Evidence on the impact of stricter enforcement policies on the number and locational choices of unauthorized immigrants is based largely on Arizona. Arizona's population of nonnaturalized citizens fell dramatically after the state's E-Verify mandate went into effect in 2007 (Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano 2015; Bohn et al. 2014) . The decrease was concentrated among less-educated and Hispanic immigrants. One study suggests that many of these immigrants left the United States altogether rather than moved to other states, perhaps because they were deported (Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano 2014). Other research, however, indicates an increase in migration from Arizona to other states (Ellis et al. 2014) . It is unclear whether a later anti-unauthorized immigration law (SB 1070) passed in Arizona in 2010 further reduced the state's population of unauthorized immigrants. A survey of undocumented migrants along the border in Mexico suggests that the flow of undocumented migrants planning to enter Arizona fell by 30 to 70 percent after the bill was passed, but undocumented immigrants already living in Arizona did not return to Mexico in large numbers (Hoekstra and Orozco-Aleman 2014) . U.S. population data suggest little effect of SB 1070 on the number of unauthorized immigrants in Arizona (Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano 2015). Evidence beyond Arizona on state omnibus immigration laws, many of which included a universal E-Verify mandate, suggests a sizable drop in the population of unauthorized immigrants in states that adopted such laws (Good 2013) .
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This paper examines the effect of state E-Verify mandates on the population of unauthorized immigrants. The next section explains how E-Verify works and where it has been implemented. We then discuss the data and empirical methodology. In addition to examining population size, we look at population dynamics to try to understand whether any observed population changes are due to interstate mobility. Previous research has not examined these questions beyond the case of Arizona, whereas we examine all states that have adopted a universal E-Verify mandate. Our results indicate that requiring employers to use E-Verify has a large negative effect of the number of unauthorized immigrants in a state. The results are not driven by any single state and do not appear to be driven by labor market conditions for lessskilled workers or for Hispanic immigrants in general. E-Verify laws appear to divert some new 1 Several studies examine another type of enforcement policy that may affect unauthorized immigrants' locational choices: 287(g) agreements, which delegate federal authority to enforce immigration laws to local law enforcement officials. Having a 287(g) program nearly doubles the propensity of immigrants to move within the United States; surprisingly, the effect is greatest among college-educated immigrants, who are not likely to be unauthorized immigrants (Watson 2013) . Growth in the number of Hispanic students slows when local labor market conditions worsen in areas that create a 287(g) program (O'Neil 2011) . In addition, states with tougher interior enforcement as measured using factor analysis on E-Verify enrollment by firms, anti-immigrant state laws and 287(g) participation had slower growth in their unauthorized immigrant population during the 2000s (Leerkes et al. 2012). unauthorized immigrants to other states and to cause some unauthorized immigrants already present in the United States to leave the country entirely.
Background on E-Verify
The employment eligibility verification laws that we examine require virtually all employers to use E-Verify. E-Verify is a free online system created and managed by the federal government. It was first rolled out to several states in 1997 under the name Basic Pilot. It became available to employers in all states in 2003, but participation remained voluntary. Employers who use EVerify enter the new worker's information on the employment eligibility form ("Form I-9"), and E-Verify compares that information with Social Security Administration (SSA) and, if needed, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) records. If there is a discrepancy, the employer is notified of a tentative nonconfirmation and is told to notify the worker, who then has eight federal work days to contest the discrepancy. During those eight days, the employer cannot fire the worker because of the discrepancy; however, the employer must fire the worker if the discrepancy is not resolved after that period.
Employers may disclose that they participate in E-Verify, but they are not allowed to verify applicants' eligibility before making a job offer. Unauthorized workers can pass E-Verify only by committing identity fraud-by supplying another person's valid Social Security number and name. In response to this concern, DHS added a photo matching tool in 2009 and now requires the employer, when possible, to verify that the photo in E-Verify is identical to the photo the employee presented when completing Form I-9. However, driver's licenses-which most workers present as their photo identification-are not currently included in the DHS database.
In 2007, Arizona became the first state to require virtually all employers to use E-Verify.
Six other states later adopted universal E-Verify laws, as listed in Table 1 We therefore expect that any effects of E-Verify on locational choices are larger among recent
immigrants. In addition, recent immigrants' locational choices are more likely to respond to EVerify mandates. Recent immigrants have not yet put down as many roots that limit mobility, such as having children enrolled in school or owning a house.
New immigrants' locational choices are likely to be particularly sensitive to E-Verify mandates since they may have the fewest roots in the United States and they need to find a job.
As Borjas (2001) points out, new arrivals tend to be more responsive to geographic differences in economic opportunities because they have a lower marginal cost than earlier immigrants or U.S.
natives of moving to any particular state since they are coming from abroad.
We also report baseline regression results below for immigrants who have at least attended some college and for less-educated U.S. natives. For comparability with our sample of likely unauthorized immigrants, we include only prime-age adults in these groups, and the sample of more-educated immigrants is restricted to those who are not naturalized citizens and are from Mexico and Central America. These groups serve as a check on whether we are capturing effects of E-Verify laws instead of other factors. Finding similar effects among likely unauthorized immigrants and these groups would suggest we are capturing something other than the effects of E-Verify laws. However, E-Verify laws may have an indirect effect on these groups if employers turn to them instead of to unauthorized immigrants. We therefore may observe in-migration effects among more-educated immigrants or less-educated natives if EVerify laws lead to better labor market opportunities for those groups. 8 On the other hand, effects may not be positive among U.S.-born Hispanics if E-Verify laws lead to discrimination against them. There is a precedent for this: Labor market outcomes worsened among U.S.-born Hispanics after the 1986 IRCA made it illegal to hire unauthorized immigrants (Dávila et al. 1998 ). In addition, some more-educated immigrants or less-educated natives may move in response to E-Verify laws that affect an unauthorized-immigrant spouse.
Methodology
We first examine the effect of the E-Verify mandates on population size using ordinary least 
where s indexes states and t indexes time (year). The dependent variable is the natural log of a measure of population size. 9 E-Verify is the fraction of the year that a state has a universal EVerify mandate in effect. We use the fraction of the year that an E-Verify mandate is in effect because we do not know the month that people were surveyed and some of the laws went into effect mid-year. We report results from specifications that measure E-Verify at time t or at time t-1, the previous year, since unauthorized immigrants may not move immediately in response to implementation of E-Verify. Our identification scheme compares the size of the likely unauthorized immigrant population before and after states implemented E-Verify. Because the regressions include state fixed effects, year fixed effects and state-specific time trends, the estimated coefficients on EVerify measure whether the population size changed within a state after it implemented E-Verify, controlling for the linear trend in the state's unauthorized immigrant population and for the business cycle. States that have not adopted E-Verify do not contribute to the identification of the coefficient on the E-Verify variable, but they do help identify the coefficients on the business cycle controls and the year fixed effects. 
If E-Verify laws cause immigrants to relocate to non-E-Verify states, β 2 will be positive. As before, we estimate the regression using either contemporaneous or year-ago E-Verify laws.
Second, we examine the effect of E-Verify on mobility among likely unauthorized immigrants. The ACS asks where people lived one year ago. We use those answers to count the number of likely unauthorized immigrants in four groups: stayers (people who lived in the state this year and last year); domestic in-migrants (people who moved to that state from another state); international in-migrants (people who moved to that state from abroad); and domestic outmigrants (people who moved from that state to another state). 10 We examine the relationship between the presence of an E-Verify law in a state last year or this year and migration into and out of that state by applying equation (1) to the number of immigrants in each of these four groups.
Results
We first examine the effect of E-Verify on the size of the likely unauthorized immigrant population-less-educated, prime-age, non-U.S. citizen immigrants from Mexico and Central 10 We are not able to look directly at international out-migrants since the ACS only captures people who live in the United States. In theory, this number can be backed out by comparing the change in a state's population with the number of in-migrants and the number of out-migrants to other states. However, such calculations are based on a residual and require strong assumptions about the ability of the ACS weights to measure short-run changes in an itinerant population.
America-using OLS regressions to estimate equation (1). Table 4 shows the results of specifications similar to Table 2 for our comparison groups: more-educated, prime-age, non-naturalized immigrants from Mexico and Central America, and less-educated U.S. natives. As expected, the presence of an E-Verify law last year or this year is not significantly related to the population size of these groups. Further, the estimated coefficients for U.S. natives (columns 5-7) are very small, indicating the laws do not affect natives' locational choices. This suggests that our regressions capture the effect of E-Verify laws rather than factors that affect all non-naturalized immigrants from Mexico and Central America or all low-skilled workers. 13 We thank Sarah Bohn for providing us with information on these laws. 14 The 287(g) program was only in effect through 2012. Our results are not sensitive to whether we keep the 287(g) variable equal to 1 or set it equal to 0 after 2012 in states that had signed a 287(g) agreement.
Another way to examine the validity of our empirical approach is to look at the effect of non-universal E-Verify laws. As discussed earlier, some states enacted E-Verify requirements that apply only to government employees or contractors. Table 5 shows the estimated effects of E-Verify laws that cover government employees and contractors as well as the effects of universal laws on the number of likely unauthorized immigrants in a state; for brevity, we only report results for contemporaneous laws. We also look at effects on less-educated U.S. natives since these laws may increase demand for U.S.-born workers who are substitutes for immigrants.
The results indicate that E-Verify requirements for government employees and government contractors have relatively little effect on the number of likely unauthorized immigrants or less-educated U.S. natives in a state. This is not surprising since relatively few unauthorized immigrants are directly affected by those laws. Laws affecting government employees have a small negative effect on the total number of likely unauthorized immigrants (row 1, column 1), while laws covering government contractors appear to boost the number of long-term immigrants (row 2, column 2) and less-educated black natives (row 2, column 6) in a state. As the bottom row of the table reports, universal laws continue to reduce the number of all, recent, and new likely unauthorized immigrants in a state when controlling for other types of EVerify laws, which 5 of the 7 states with a universal mandate had before putting a universal mandate into effect.
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The effect of E-Verify laws on the number of unauthorized immigrants in a state may increase or decrease over time. It may take a while for unauthorized immigrants to learn about EVerify laws or to be affected by them, in which case the effect may increase over time.
Alternatively, unauthorized immigrants (and their employers) may initially react to E-Verify laws but learn over time that the laws are not strictly enforced or are easily evaded. To examine the effect of E-Verify over time, we added to equation (1) a variable that measures the number of years that a universal E-Verify law has been in place; the variable equals zero the first year a law is in effect and increases by one each subsequent year. Table 6 reports the regressions results. The negative effect of E-Verify on the number of recent immigrants grows significantly over time (column 3). For new arrivals, in contrast, the effect does not change significantly over time-the drop in the number of newly arriving likely authorized immigrants appears to be sustained but not to grow over time (column 4). However, the more-negative effect over time among recent immigrants may be partly mechanical. 16 Since new arrivals in year t are recent immigrants in years t+1 through t+5, the large, sustained drop in the number of newly arriving likely unauthorized immigrants is likely to translate into a negative effect on the number of recent likely unauthorized immigrants that grows over time. In any case, we caution that only three states had E-Verify laws in place for more than three years in our sample: Arizona, Mississippi and Utah. A longer time period for more states is needed to better understand how the effect of E-Verify changes over time.
Does the number of unauthorized immigrants affect E-Verify law adoption?
The seven states that adopted universal E-Verify mandates are all relatively conservative states located in the South or Southwest. To varying degrees, these states experienced an influx of immigrants during the 1990s and early 2000s. However, some other states that also experienced an influx of immigrants during that period did not adopt universal E-Verify laws. Many of those 16 However, the drop in new immigrants does not drive all of the results. If so, the initial effect of the laws, as measured by "E-Verify in effect" variable, would be zero. This is not the case for recent likely unauthorized immigrants. In addition, if states that adopt an E-Verify law are included in the sample only the first year that an EVerify law goes into effect there, having an E-Verify law remains significantly negatively related to the number of all and recent likely unauthorized immigrants. As shown in Table 7 , none of the results indicate that having a larger number of likely unauthorized immigrants or a faster growth rate of that population caused states to adopt EVerify. 17 Although not conclusive proof that the adoption of E-Verify is exogenous, the results suggest that something other than changes in the population of unauthorized immigrants or factors that led to changes in that population caused states to adopt E-Verify.
Evidence on spillovers
To determine whether E-Verify laws reduce the total population of unauthorized immigrants or just reallocate them across states, we first examine spillovers, or whether E-Verify laws in other states affect the number of likely unauthorized immigrants living in a given state. To do this, we construct two measures of E-Verify laws in other states: the fraction of bordering states with a universal E-Verify law in effect, and a distance-weighted measure of the presence of universal EVerify laws in other states that gives less weight to states that are further away. As in equation (2), the regressions include one of those two variables and a variable measuring the presence of E-Verify in a given state that year. Table 8 States do not appear to move to nearby states in response to E-Verify laws. In fact, the fraction of bordering states with E-Verify is negatively related to the number of non-recent likely unauthorized immigrants in a state (panel A, column 2). This result may be an artifact of the geographic clustering of states that adopted E-Verify laws.
Our failure to find that E-Verify mandates increase the number of already-present likely unauthorized immigrants in nearby states does not necessarily mean that they leave the country entirely when a state requires E-Verify. Instead, they may relocate in a pattern unrelated to the distance from E-Verify states. We therefore turn next to an analysis of mobility patterns among likely unauthorized immigrants.
Mobility
In a final effort to determine how E-Verify laws affect the number of unauthorized immigrants,
we examine the effect of universal E-Verify laws on the number of likely unauthorized immigrants who stay in a state, the numbers who migrate to a state from other states and from abroad and the number who leave a state in order to migrate to another state. Table 9 However, a relatively low share of non-recent immigrants is unauthorized compared with the two other time-since-migration groups we examine here. More of the non-recent group is presumably made up of documented immigrants, who may benefit from E-Verify laws that reduce competition in the labor market.
The results in Table 9 do not indicate major migration across states by unauthorized immigrants already present in the United States. If so, we would expect to observe a negative effect on in-migration from other states and a positive effect on out-migration to other states. We do not observe such effects. This is consistent with the failure to find positive effects of other states' policies on the number of long-time and recent immigrants in a given state in Table 8 . Yet E-Verify laws cause the number of likely unauthorized immigrants who remain in a state to fall, as shown in Table 9 , and the population of recent likely unauthorized immigrants to decline, as shown in Table 2 . Taken as a whole, the results here thus suggest that most of the drop in the number of already-present unauthorized immigrants in states that adopt universal E-Verify laws is due to them leaving the United States entirely.
Conclusion
The results here point to several conclusions: First, E-Verify laws reduce the number of unauthorized immigrants in a state. This effect tends to be concentrated among recent arrivals and is particularly large for newly arriving immigrants. Second, the evidence suggests that EVerify laws divert some newly arriving unauthorized immigrants to other states. The number of new likely unauthorized immigrants rises in a state as more nearby states begin requiring employers to use E-Verify.
Among immigrants already present in the country, however, we do not find evidence of migration to other states in response to E-Verify laws. This suggests that at least some of these immigrants-and perhaps many of them-leave the country entirely. However, the American Number of observations 510 510 510 510 * p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p < 0.01 Note: Shown are estimated coefficients on a variable measuring the fraction of the year that a universal E-Verify law was in effect in a state. The dependent variable is logged. Each entry is from a separate OLS regression. The regressions include the log of state real GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, housing permits, housing starts, and the log of real state government expenditures per capita (all lagged one year); state and year fixed effects; and state-specific linear time trends. Observations are weighted using the sum of the person weights in the population group. Standard errors are robust and clustered on state. Number of observations 500 500 500 500 * p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p < 0.01 Note: Shown are estimated coefficients on a variable measuring the fraction of the year that a universal E-Verify law was in effect in a state. The dependent variable is logged. Each entry is from a separate OLS regression. The regressions include the log of state real GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, housing permits, housing starts, and the log of real state government expenditures per capita (all lagged one year); state and year fixed effects; and state-specific linear time trends. Observations are weighted using the sum of the person weights in the population group. Standard errors are robust and clustered on state. Number of observations 510 510 510 510 * p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p < 0.01 Note: Shown are estimated coefficients on variables measuring the fraction of the year that a universal E-Verify law was in effect in a state and the number of years it has been in effect. The dependent variable is logged. Each column is from a separate OLS regression. The regressions include the log of state real GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, housing permits, housing starts, and the log of real state government expenditures per capita (all lagged one year); state and year fixed effects; and state-specific linear time trends. Observations are weighted using the sum of the person weights in the population group. Number of observations 459 459 459 459 * p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p < 0.01 Note: Shown are estimated coefficients on the log of the population size. The dependent variable indicates whether a state adopted a universal E-Verify law that year. Each entry is from a separate OLS regression. The estimated coefficients shown in row 3 are multiplied by 1000. The regressions include the log of state real GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, housing permits, housing starts, and the log of real state government expenditures per capita (all lagged one year); state and year fixed effects; and state-specific linear time trends. Observations are weighted using the sum of the person weights in the population group. Standard errors are robust and clustered on state. Number of observations 510 510 510 510 * p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p < 0.01 Note: Shown are estimated coefficients on variables measuring the fraction of the year that a universal E-Verify law was in effect in a state and a measure of E-Verify in bordering states or in all other states. The dependent variable is logged. Each set of two coefficients is from a separate OLS regression. The regressions include the log of state real GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, housing permits, housing starts, and the log of real state government expenditures per capita (all lagged one year); state and year fixed effects; and state-specific linear time trends. Observations are weighted using the sum of the person weights in the population group. Standard errors are robust and clustered on state. Number of observations 510 510 510 * p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p < 0.01 Note: Shown are estimated coefficients on variables measuring the fraction of the year that a universal E-Verify law was in effect in a state and a measure of E-Verify in bordering states or in all other states. The dependent variable is logged. Each set of two coefficients is from a separate OLS regression. The regressions include the log of state real GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, housing permits, housing starts, and the log of real state government expenditures per capita (all lagged one year); state and year fixed effects; and state-specific linear time trends. Observations are weighted using the sum of the person weights in the population group. Standard errors are robust and clustered on state.
